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Introduction: times for insight, to learn the lessons from the crisis 
and for search of change  
 
 
“In times of change, learners inherit the earth, while the learned find 
themselves beautifully equipped to deal with a world that no longer 
exists.” 
Eric Hoffer, 1973 
 
he world and the global economy undergo a process of major trans-
formations caused by the unprecedented lockdown of national econo-
mies, the international trade, supply and transportation channels, and 
cooperation chains. Hundreds of thousands and even millions of people around 
the world were literally sacrificed - physically and socially - for the common 
goal to stop the pandemic. Today, the main task of all governments, economic 
policy-makers, and international financial institutions around the world is to 
find a sound and long-lasting sustainable balance between the measures that 
have to be taken to contain the coronavirus pandemic and the like shocks and 
the creating of effective conditions that are needed for economic, financial and 
social recovery and development.  
Despite the record levels of fiscal incentives launched over the last two 
months both on national level in a number of economies and on international 
and supranational level (such as the € 750 billion EU Recovery Plan), the global 
macroeconomic situation faces unprecedented levels of risk, uncertainty and 
challenge. Economies are trying to respond to excessive shocks in supply and 
demand of a scale no one has witnessed before. According to the IMF, the 
global economy is in a "synchronized slowdown". Markets are still trying to 
hold up despite the magnitude and ferocity of the macroeconomic storm, but 
with no success so far. In turn, the central banks around the world have 
mobilized unprecedented financial resources through financial instruments and 
incentives that were unheard of during the global financial crisis of 2008-2010. 
Nevertheless, all attempts to predict the course and outcome of the current 
global crisis have failed due to a number of reasons: macroeconomic data is 
measured and "mined" with a significant lag from the actual events, and the 
indicators we can use to understand their context in logical interaction change 
almost daily.       
 About 15 years ago, in the mid-90’s, the famous economist and former 
Chair of the Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United States (FED) Ben 
Bernanke pointed out that “to understand [the causes of] the Great Depression 
is the Holy Grail of macroeconomics,” but “we do not yet have our hands on 
the Grail by any means.” He also wrote that “not only did the Great Depression 
T 
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give birth to macroeconomics as a distinct field of study, but also – to an extent 
that is not always fully appreciated – the experience of the 1930s continues to 
influence macroeconomists’ beliefs, policy recommendations, and research 
agendas.” (Bernanke, 1995). Indeed, since 1936, when Keynes published his 
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money  (Keynes, 1936), which 
“launched” the era of macroeconomics1, a plethora of various explanations ha-
ve been given to the Great Depression, which, according to Bernanke, “remains 
a fascinating intellectual challenge” because we still cannot plausibly explain  
how the economic situation deteriorated so much and remained such for so long 
(almost until the end of World War II) after the  stock market crash in October 
1929.  
We emphasize all this not by chance, because with these thoughts in 
mind, we can define the aim of this article, which is to identify, understand and 
discuss the macroeconomic challenges and risks that characterize the pheno-
menon of the present economic and financial crisis (with a special focus on its 
manifestation in Bulgaria) as well as to investigate their dynamic interdepen-
dence. Although history never repeats itself exactly, we believe that this crisis 
has some common characteristics with the great financial crises in the past: the 
1929–1934 crisis, the crises in the 1970s and the global financial crisis in the 
period 2008–2010. 
The development and the extreme complexity of the current global 
crisis require further research in this field. The research hypothesis the author 
has tried to prove is that we cannot solve the current crisis using the tools 
employed in the past to deal with such crises and that we are now facing a new 
and unique combination of economic, financial, social, geopolitical and 
psychological factors, challenges, and risks, the mechanism of interaction of 
which is yet to be understood. But there is no doubt that it will require a 
significant change in our views on international cooperation and the processes 






                                                          
              
1
  In his important research paper The Importance of Beliefs in Shaping Macroeconomic 
Outcomes, Rebuilding Macroeconomics, 20 April 2020, Roger A. Farmer (Warwick 
University) also states that “he history of macroeconomics began with the publication of The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money by John M. Keynes in 1936. Before that 
date, economics was separated into price theory, which dealt with the determination of relative 
prices, monetary theory (Patinkin, 1956), and Arthur Pigou’s business cycle theory, which was 
captured in his book Industrial Fluctuations (Pigou, 1923).   
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I. What do we know about the characteristics of the current 
crisis?  
 
Recessions, as an intrinsic component of the business cycle, are usually 
caused by a combination of stark economic and financial imbalances created 
during the expansion phase and delayed restrictive monetary measures within 
the cycle accompanied by errors in the implemented economic, monetary and 
fiscal policy. The current situation is quite different, as the main cause of this 
crisis is a completely exogenous shock, unrelated to the economic and financial 
spheres. Governments around the world have responded to the pandemic of the 
highly contagious Covid-19 with aggressive economic "lockdowns" or restric-
tive economic and social measures in order to stop any further spread of the 
virus. This immediately led to a sharp decline in the aggregate production and 
consumption in almost all economies; a decline that has been going on for more 
than three months now.  
So, the first conclusion we can draw is that we are witnessing a 
recession2, created by an external shock - in this case an acute virus - and 
backed by government decisions for the necessary temporary or partial 
suspension and/or closure of economic activities and national borders of entire 
economies or trade zones, and international trade restrictions aiming to prevent 
a major humanitarian crisis.  
As Roubini (2020) points out, unlike the global recessions of 1929 and 
2008, this new, coronavirus-induced global crisis comprises both a supply 
shock and a demand shock. The supply shock is caused by the disruption of 
established chains of international supply and cooperation, slower processes of 
world trade, and closed borders, which significantly slow down the global 
supply processes, if they do not stop them altogether. This supply shock, in 
addition to widespread fear, panic and uncertainty, led to a demand shock as 
well. This combination caused the fastest contraction and decline of production 
in the modern economic history, which affected not only the most developed 
economies and the Euro zone, but also the economy of China and other Asian 
economies and all emerging economies. Undoubtedly, all economies will report 
officially various levels of recession. Moreover, never before have the depth 
                                                          
2 In their report of June 8, 2020, The Business Cycle Dating Committee (BCDC) of 
the US National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) has determined that a peak in monthly 
economic activity occurred in the U.S. economy in February 2020. According to the 
Committee, the peak marks the end of the expansion that began in June 2009 and the beginning 
of a recession in accord with their definition of this term. Another significant fact related to this 
recession is the unprecedented magnitude of the decline. USA’s GDP for the first quarter of 
2020 was about 6% below its level of 2019Q4 and the decline is expected to exceed 30 or even 
40% during the second quarter of 2020. In June 2020 alone, according to NY FED and 
GDPNow, the decline was 48.5%. Refer to the text for further information.   
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and speed of the contraction in world production been so great and extremely 
rapid – much greater and faster than those of the Great Depression of 1929. 
And that makes today's crisis unique compared to all the others. The crisis of 
2008-2010 was a crisis of aggregate demand as its main cause. It demanded 
solutions that would create fiscal stimulus. That's why the Obama admi-
nistration (at that time) dealt with the crisis3 far more successfully and faster 
than Europe, which instead of implementing a plan of strong fiscal incentives 
to stimulate demand, chose the exact opposite path of a sharp contraction in 
public spending and salaries as a policy of austerity and naturally came out of 
the crisis much later and sustained much greater damage.       
In April, in their World Economic Outlook blog the IMF projected 
global growth in 2020 to fall to -3 percent. This is a downgrade of 6.3 
percentage points from January 2020, a major revision over only three months. 
According to IMF, this makes the “Great Lockdown” - as they refer to it - the 
worst recession since the Great Depression, and far worse than the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008. (Gopinath, 2020)  
Figure. 1 shows a comparison between the real growth of the GDP of 
both selected advanced economies and emerging market and developing 
economies during the crisis of 2008-2010 and the actual crisis of 2020 as year-
on-year percent change: 
                                                          
3 It is worth noting that on 17 February 2009, less than a month after his inauguration, 
President Obama signed a stimulus huge both in terms of financial resource (about 800 bln. 
USD) and number of pages (1073 pages), which included a whole package of acts known as 
the Recovery Act. The document was signed literally during the maelstrom of the global 
financial crisis. Obama’s administration followed the “manual” of Keynes, the “godfather” of 
fiscal stimulus and his advice „to prime the pump“ during downturns, i.e. stimulate growth by 
pouring gobs of public money into the economy. Michael Grunwald (2012) explains in detail 
haw this decision was made and turned out a success.   




Figure 1. GLOBAL CRISIS: Comparison between the real growth of the 
GDP of both advanced economies and emerging market and developing 
economies during the crisis of 2008-2010 and the actual crisis of 2020 –  
the changes are in real GDP growth (year-on-year percent change) 
 
The economists of the large investment banks Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs (Kennedy, 2020) predict that advanced economies will contract 
with more than 30% in the second quarter of 2020 following the contraction of 
6% in the first three months. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President James 
Bullard predicted the U.S. unemployment rate may hit 30% in the second 
quarter because of shutdowns to combat the coronavirus, with an unprece-
dented 50% drop in gross domestic product. (Matthews, 2020). 
 In May 2020, central banks around the world (including the Euro Area 
and the EU) stimulated and promised to support their economies by 2021 with 
unprecedented record liquidity in various forms of quantitative easing (for their 
banking systems) with a view to halting or delaying the forthcoming debt crisis 
of historical proportions. Governments also responded with fiscal measures and 
increased budget deficits. Nevertheless, the IMF predicts (see Figure 2) that the 
cumulative output loss over 2020 and 2021 from the pandemic crisis could be 
minimum around 9-10 trillion USD.  
 




Figure 2. Total Output Losses for the Global Economy: The cumulative 
output loss over 2020 and 2021 from the pandemic crisis could be minimum 
around 9-10 trillion USD. 
 
As the unfolding of the crisis is still at an early stage, we shall assume 
that it has several working characteristics and build on these assumptions in 
order to form the main pillars of further reflections on the coming macroeco-
nomic challenges and risks in the short- and medium as well as in the long-term 
run:  
• Every major national economy or group of economies in the world 
will experience an extremely sharp downturn, perhaps the largest since the 
middle of the last century. There is no economy that is immune to the impact 
and effects of this crisis. Potential economic, financial and social damage will 
at best be within a limited period of time. 
• COVID-19 will affect all vital systems of the global economy. As 
Roubini (2020) points out: “In other words, every component of aggregate 
demand – consumption, capital spending, exports – is in unprecedented free 
fall. What took around three years during the [2008] global financial crisis and 
the Great Depression to play out (i.e. stock markets to collapse, debt and credit 
markets to seize up, economic stagnation, unemployment rates to skyrocket), in 
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the current crisis have materialized in three weeks. … So, we know that this is 
a Great Recession that is worse than the global financial crisis of 2008. As 
such, the risk of a new Great Depression, worse than the original – a Greater 
Depression – is rising by the day and this time it is unlikely to last only two or 
three quarters. It may well persist during most of the following year.“  
• The main economic drives are slow and limited, and this will slow 
down the overall creation of wealth among all social strata.  
• At this stage, economic downturn is not due to decreasing demand. 
The effect of demand shock will come later, perhaps as late as at the end of the 
second or third quarter of 2020, when economists will be able to estimate the 
expected duration of the crisis. 
• What is and will remain important for both the national economies 
and the international markets, will not only be the depth of the economic 
downturn in the second and third quarters of 2020, but also the duration of the 
expected crisis and its effects for the weaknesses of each economy. If, 
depending on the exogenous shock, the crisis lasts only a few months, by the 
end of 2020 at the latest, things could return to the previous state relatively 
quickly, but if it lasts longer, the "recovery" will be quite problematic. 
• The longer it takes for each national economy to recover and return 
(if at all possible) to its "normal state", the more difficult it will be to avoid the 
risk of massive bankruptcies of companies and households, and the more severe 
their consequences will be. 
• The nature of this crisis is such that it will be "guided" and affected 
mainly by the services sector and will be affected to a lesser extent by 
investment decisions and industrial development. 
• The aggressive interventions of most central banks around the world 
have so far managed to reduce the risk of a credit crisis like the one we had in 
the period 2008-2009, but such a risk still exists.  
• Notwithstanding the importance of the promised and undertaken 
massive fiscal stimulus programs, they can only help the economies recover 
rather than prevent their current downturn. 
• At this stage, considering the demand shock described above, we do 
not believe that the average global volume of fiscal stimulus for the national 
economies and regions will raise the level of inflation in the short run. In fact, 
it will create conditions to reduce inflation to some extent and help some market 
players with poor or inefficient performance, who will survive by increasing 
their debt rather than their sales revenue. Grants and credit facilities will 
undoubtedly provide a backstop, but at the same time they "undermine" the 
efforts to increase labour productivity by keeping afloat the less efficient 
companies.  
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• Since this crisis affects mainly the services sector, it can definitely 
be said that especially in developed economies, the stronger and larger a 
business is (above average), the easier it will be to deal with the crisis, and vice 
versa. This will increase further the economic and social inequality of social 
strata. According to World Bank Director David Malpass, more than 60 million 
people worldwide could be pushed into “extreme poverty” by the effects of 
coronavirus (Malpass, 2020).   
• Due to its specific nature and characteristics, this crisis will slow 
down and change the processes of globalization. Global flows and channels of 
trade, cooperation, labour, and capital will be less accessible for a prolonged 
period of time as, unfortunately, economic nationalism and protectionist 
policies become more popular. Political pressures and deglobalisation trends, 
influenced by the nature of the current crisis, will deal severe blows to the 
economic and social development worldwide and it is unlikely to return to its 
previous average rates and trends.   
• The nature of this new global crisis has already dealt severe blows to 
almost all international and supranational institutions and organizations that 
advocate the processes of globalization. We observe the dramatic failure of the 
World Health Organization, a highly hesitant and controversial EU policy, the 
dispassionate behaviour of the World Trade Organization; of NATO; of the 
United Nations, of G20, and the IMF, whose failure to offer an effective 
solution to the profound debt crisis in Argentina did not Improve the credibility 
of this organization. All this cannot but act as a catalyst (negative or positive) 
to the destructive effect of this crisis for the hitherto established "world order".         
• The crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic will also cause global 
shocks. According to the UN’s World Food Program, the number of people in 
the world who will experience acute malnutrition will double in just one year 
due to the shock caused by the crisis, and will reach 265 million4. 
• There is no doubt that Covid-19 and the resulting economic crisis 
will require profound structural changes in the global economy over the next 
few years, including a different balance between economic nationalism and 
globalization, radical reforms of trade and monetary unions with a focus on 
more developed digital economy, long periods of extremely low interest rates 
and policies of significantly larger budget deficits. All of this brings us back to 
Keynes's General Theory that in order for budget deficits, government fiscal 
stimulus programs, and central bank "quantitative easing" policies to be 
                                                          
4 This is a substantial increase of more than 130 million people from 2019. Most of 
them are in countries with military conflicts, drastic climate changes and grave economic 
shocks and social problems. A separate detailed analysis deserves the Global Report on Food 
Crises, 2020 and the official news release of the World Food Program of 21 April 2020.   
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effective, the return (or "payback" as Keynes puts it in his publication) on 
investments made and financial support provided through debt instruments 
must "give birth" to a higher rate of return than the debt used to fund them. This 
is particularly true for programs established at the expense of higher budget 
deficits.     
 
 
II. Major macroeconomic challenges and risks beyond  
the immediate recession 
 
When we analyse the macroeconomic challenges and risks arising from 
the coronavirus pandemic, we must not ignore that today, just over ten years 
after the previous crisis, the global and, in particular the European economies 
still face a number of extremely risky factors, the importance and content of 
which indicated even in 2019 that a new, bigger crisis may be looming on the 
horizon. After the 2008-2012 crisis, the global financial system continued to 
grow and accumulated a debt of more than USD 200 trillion, which is an 
enormous burden for a highly toxic economic and geopolitical environment 
(Ivanov, D., 2019).  
The risks were observed by many analysts: the slowdown of China’s 
economy - the world's largest consumer; sharply declining return on invest-
ment; a growing crescendo of dangerous populist and protectionist policies and 
decisions; covert trade wars between the United States and China; political 
chaos in the United States; strong political and economic discord in the EU and 
the Euro Area; the Brexit which was troublesome not only for Britain, but for 
the whole EU, Italy’s economy in a technical recession, uncertain Italian banks, 
a huge political rift in France, even the economic leader of Europe - Germany 
from 2019 was on the verge of possible recession; continuing volatility of the 
emerging economies.  
In January 2019, the World Bank published their Global Economic 
Prospects report with the subheading Darkening Skies, which is indicative of 
the bleak outlook depicted in the report (World Bank, 2019). The report of the 
World Bank revised downwardly the estimate growth rate of the advanced 
economies for the period 2019–2020 from 2.2 % to maximum 1.6%. 
And only a year later, a coronavirus pandemic broke out. In addition to 
its characteristics, discussed in the previous chapter, the crisis, which affected 
the economies all over the world and revealed all flaws and deficiencies of the 
world economy and above all the huge aggregate unsecured debts of many 
developed economies.   
Figure 3 shows that, according to the projections towards 2024, the 
expected total government debt of the G20 countries would reach a minimum 
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of 95 per cent of their total GDP. Note that the data was collected before the 
large fiscal stimulation interventions since the beginning of the coronavirus 
pandemic, which are expected to increase.5   
  
 
Figure. 3 Expected total government debt (towards 2024) as a share of gross 
domestic product in G20 countries in 2018 and projections for 2024. 
According to the projections, it would reach a minimum of 95 per cent of 
their total GDP (this calculation was made before the large fiscal 
stimulation interventions during April and May 2020) 
 
In this sense, the first and foremost macroeconomic challenge is the 
exceptional indebtedness of many national economies. In fact, the level of 
total debt in the world today, compared to the economic result (in terms of 
GDP), is more than twice as high as it was at the beginning of the crisis of 2008. 
Today, central banks continue to inject liquidity into national or regional 
banking systems. This growing and obviously difficult to service debt (despite 
of its cheaper price) creates an additional hurdle in the fight against the crisis. 
This situation cannot but hinder the required rapid recovery from the crisis. The 
debt of the Euro Area today exceeds 84.2% of its member states’ GDP6. And 
this debt was accumulated before the coronavirus crisis. France has a gross 
external debt of 129.5% of its GDP. The Italian economy is in a deep debt crisis 
                                                          
5 The US sovereign debt alone is expected to exceed 115.8 % of the country’s GDP 
in 2024.  
6 Authors’ calculation using data from ECB, Eurostat and ECB for 2019.  
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with 156% debt to GDP (for 2020). Spain and Portugal have external debt in 
excess of 135% and 144%, respectively, and Greece continues to be heavily 
burdened with debt in excess of 181% of its GDP, despite the debt restructuring 
in 2012 (Kraemer, 2020). The big problem for the Euro Area economies is that 
many of them, and in particular those from the southern periphery of the Euro 
Area, have debt repayment schedules that completely coincide with the next 
few years until 2024, during which period these economies will have to deal 
with both the recession and massive internal structural problems (see Fig. 4).    
 
Figure 4. Sovereign debt repayment schedule for select Euro Area 
economies from the periphery of the Euro Area, including the repayment 
ratio towards their GDP (in percentage of GDP) 
  
Regarding indebtedness as a significant macroeconomic challenge for 
both the global economy and, above all, for Europe, it must be said that the 
level of corporate and private sector indebtedness in the EU member states is 
far from being overlooked. This year's crisis and the deglobalization processes 
will soon make the levels of this debt difficult to service and potentially leading 
to massive corporate bankruptcies, which can trigger a spiral of bank failures. 
All this, as well as the continuing increase of debt levels, will contribute to a 
slow and painful W-shaped or L-shaped recovery of national economies, rather 
than the expected rapid V-shaped recovery.    
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The next biggest macroeconomic recovery challenge and risk will 
be the status and development of the EU economy and in particular the 
Euro Area. This is the next. At this stage, the IMF’s forecasts and estimates 
predict that the current crisis will be over by the end of 2020 and that from the 
beginning of 2021 at the latest almost all national economies will begin to 
recover. However, all reputable international financial organizations make their 
forecasts based on a minimum of two scenarios: a scenario with only one 
pandemic wave and a scenario with a second, recurring pandemic wave. Figure 
5 presents the latest IMF forecast, but the author does not believe that the 
current global crisis will end so quickly. According to the latest Economic 
Report of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development of 
June 10, 2020 (OECD, 2020), with a single coronavirus pandemic wave the 
global economic growth rate will fall by 7.6% in 2020 and the unemployment 
rate will rise to 10%.    
 
Figure 5. Comparisons and IMF growth projections (GDP growth rate) 
 for the period 2019 - 2021. 
 
Europe will face most problems, despite ECB's ambitious sovereign 
bond purchases programme to support the EU's economies. The historical 
political mistakes in the architecture and organization of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the delay in resolving them 
remain some of the greatest difficulties and challenges. The single currency 
was intended as a means to unite Europe's economies, but instead of 
convergence all indicators show that today there is even greater social and 
economic divergence within what should have been an “optimal currency area”, 
which creates a risk of slowing down the process of recovery of the European 
economy.  
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This time, the looming second crisis (after the crisis of 2010-2012) in 
the euro area is likely to be deeper and more complex and pose a greater overall 
threat for the union than the previous crisis. There are at least four main 
indicators for such a development:  
1. The fundamental contradictions in the construction of the Euro Area 
could not be eliminated completely, despite the last eight years of continuous 
debate on how this could happen. And while the focus of these controversies 
previously was a relatively weak Euro Area member state such as Greece, today 
the focus is on Italy, the EU's third strongest economy, which was already in a 
deep crisis before the coronavirus pandemic. Figure 6 shows the difference 
between the levels of industrial production in Italy and Germany.   
 
Figure 6. Industrial production of Italy and Germany (1990 = 100) 
 
The main fundamental contradiction of the Euro Area - that its ad-hoc 
supranational monetary policy is not institutionally and legally guaranteed by 
an effective balancing and risk-sharing mechanism to coordinate imbalances 
between countries and regions in the area – still exists. Thus, the Euro Area 
does not yet act as a "transfer currency union", and Germany itself continues to 
be an advocate not for a transfer union but for a union of "monetary and 
economic stability" (Kaletsky, 2020).   
2. The economic development of the Euro Area countries, including 
that of its strongest economy – Germany, is still slow. This slowness and weak-
ness of the economies has been and continues to be particularly characteristic 
of the countries from the southern periphery of the Euro Area. Greece's GDP 
for 2019 only reached the level of 2002, while Spain, Portugal, Italy and even 
France have not been able to reach their pre-crisis levels since 2008. Average 
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wages have stagnated, social inequality has risen, especially in Spain and Italy 
together with their public debt. 
3. The issue of the role and rights of the ECB, which, unlike other 
central banks, is still not fully operational as a central bank with unlimited 
capacity to buy member states’ government bonds in the event of a crisis, has 
not been fully resolved. This issue was provisionally resolved after the outbreak 
of the coronavirus pandemic (with the establishment of the EU Recovery Fund 
of € 750 billion7  - see Figure 7), but it has not yet been voted on and has already 
created a huge conflict between the northern and southern member states of the 
Euro Area and the Governing Council of the European Central Bank.  
 
Figure 7. The announced potential ECB sovereign bond purchases 
programme 2020-2021 (share of projected budget deficits of some member 
states) 
                                                          
7 The so-called Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), a programme for 
sovereign bond purchases with initial budget of € 750 billion, later increased to € 1.35 trillion 
due to a Franco-German political initiative and extended for another six months until June 2021. 
The European Central Bank also confirmed its intention to re-invest all contractual maturity 
receipts from PEPP at least until the end of 2022. The final draft of the PEPP has not yet been 
passed as there are a number of questions regarding the distribution criteria, its size, and the 
mechanism of its implementation. At this stage, overall budget of this initiative for recovery of 
the EU economies has grown to 1.95 trillion euro, including 1.35 trillion for PEPP and 480 
billion for PSPP (the Regular Public Sector Purchase Programme of EUR 20 billion monthly - 
the decision and the "legacy" of Mario Draghi) and an additional 120 billion euro of the 
extended PSPP. The aim of this massive recovery fund is to cover at least 75% of the expected 
budget deficits of the EU member states, which will increase during the crisis.   




4. The idea of a European Banking Union remained unfinished, mainly 
due to Germany’s resistance to this idea. One of the main reasons for this is the 
still large amount of non-performing loans in the balance sheets of many 
European banks worth a total of 786 billion Euro (of which about 350 billion 
in Italian banks).8 The European Fiscal Union does not work actively and in 
accordance with its functions. Now, after the growing budget deficits of a 
number of European economies and the growth of their debts, it is obvious that 
the rules of the Fiscal Union are not observed at all.  
All these contradictions in the Euro Area, as well as the heterogeneity 
of the structure of their economies, will create additional asymmetric 
opportunities to overcome the current crisis due to its specifics. Figure 8 shows 
how the asymmetric sectoral structure of some economies would benefit the 
German economy at the expense of the others.  
 
Figure 8. A forecast for asymmetric exit from the crisis of the leading Euro 
Area economies 
 
The potential asymmetric exit from the crisis will increase further 
the economic and social divergence across the EU, although the goal is 
exactly the opposite. This is exactly what happened after the crisis of 2008, and 
it is very likely that the same process will be repeated now. The dynamics of 
                                                          
8 According to data from ECB. 
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real GDP growth of selected EU economies since 2008 in Figure 9 clearly 
shows the divergent recovery rates of these economies after the 2008 crisis.  
 
Figure 9. dynamics of real GDP growth of selected EU economies (2008–
2020) 
  
Considering the above analysis of the risks associated with the current 
crisis in Europe and the subsequent recovery, we believe that the IMF growth 
projections for the Euro Area for the period 2019-2021 are slightly optimistic 
(see Fig. 10). Most analysts believe that the slowdown this year will be about 
10%, and for next year their forecasts are more moderate, given a number of 
factors and risks that have been discussed so far.    




Figure 10. IMF Growth Projections for the Euro Area for the period of 
2019-2021. 
 
Several other macroeconomic challenges and risks that are not related 
to the coronavirus shock are expected on the horizon of this and subsequent 
years. These include the apparent intensification of the trade war between 
the United States and China, and possibly between the United States and 
the European Union; the growing geopolitical controversy and turbulence 
between the United States, on the one hand, and China, Russia, Iran, and North 
Korea, on the other; the dangerous fluctuation of the prices of oil and other raw 
materials. A major macroeconomic and political challenge that will be 
persistently on the agenda of many governments around the world will be 
the continuing widening of the economic and social disparities and the 
growing inequalities in many countries.  
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III. Macroeconomic challenges and risks for Bulgaria  
 
The main macroeconomic and political challenges and risks for 
Bulgaria this and the following 2021 and 2022 years seem to be the lack of a 
clear program for overcoming the systemic crisis which has plagued Bulgaria’s 
economy for many years, the change of the economic model and the mitigation 
of the economic and political confrontation and polarization in the country. 
Without economic and social stability, our country will not be able to 
effectively control, allocate, and manage the significant financial resources that 
will come from both the European budget and the ECB. Bulgaria faces 
powerful economic, demographic, social and technological forces and trends 
that are changing dynamically our economic and financial potential.   
There are still a number of macroeconomic imbalances and unfinished 
institutional elements of Bulgaria’s market economy, which continue to create 
economic and financial uncertainty and inequality; hamper the modernization 
of the economy and reduce its competitiveness. These imbalances are about to 
increase in the second half of 2020, increasing the risk of stagnation and a slow 
exit from the crisis. Today, the theoretical postulates of low trade and 
investment barriers, lack of red tape, strict fiscal discipline, attractive invest-
ment climate, financial and banking infrastructure that motivates entre-
preneurship and innovation, which are considered the fundamental principles 
and drives of economic growth, are opposed to a number of contradictory 
nationalist and protectionist policies.   
Regarding inequality, Eurostat’s GINI Coefficient `for Bulgaria 
indicates that inequality has increased rapidly over the last nine years. Bulgaria 
is officially the country with the largest inequality in the whole EU with a GINI 
Coefficient of 40.2% and is outranked considerable (with almost 5 percentage 
points) by the next country in the ranking Lithuania9.  
Even more dramatic is the severe inequality in terms of wealth 
accumulated over the years. It systematically creates another inequality – 
the inequality of opportunity. Measuring the interdependence between 
income inequality and intergenerational prosperity with the so-called Great 
Gatsby Curve (the name of the curve refers to the main character in Scott 
Fitzgerald’s novel), introduced by the economist Alan Krueger (2012), shows 
that in Bulgaria there is already a persistent relationship between the advantages 
and disadvantages of income and the well-being passed on from parents to 
                                                          
9 Moreover, for the last five years Bulgaria has consistently ranked last (in some years 
shared the last place with Lithuania) in terms of Eurostat's six main indicators measuring the 
social standards for poverty and social exclusion in Europe., Eurostat, Dataset Details: People 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion, 2020. 
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children, and new generations find it increasingly difficult to climb the social 
ladder when, figuratively speaking, the “steps of the ladder” are too far apart; 
i.e. without a previously accumulated "supporting" wealth, the ascent becomes 
impossible.  
A particularly complicated problem for the recovery of Bulgaria’s 
economy (not only from the current crisis!) is its changed structure. Instead of 
a high-tech and industrially developed economy with developed agriculture, the 
Bulgarian economy has become a service economy (see Fig. 11) and this is 
what will make its recovery from the crisis very difficult, because the services 
sector was affected most. 
 
Figure 11. Share of the gross added value by main aggregated economic 
sectors of Bulgaria in the first quarter of 2019 and 2020 (in percent) 
 
In Bulgaria, low-income households and companies are affected most. 
Regardless of the temporary measures to maintain lending, liquidity of 
businesses and households, Bulgaria’s fiscal and monetary markets are more 
limited than those in the developed economies. In order to keep the capitals in 
the country, the monetary tightening will be much stricter than in other 
advanced economies. The author disagrees with the common opinion that the 
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measures are adequate and believes that corporate indebtedness, intercompany 
debt, exhausted tax incentives (in the current tax system), political uncertainty 
and the ongoing process of impoverishment will play a role in slowing down 
the recovery of our economy. This will lead to a decline in consumption, which 
actually existed before the coronavirus crisis (see Fig. 12), capital spending, 
investments, housing and real estate, car sales, exports, incomes, imports and 
all elements of economic and business activity. Growth will be too slow.  
 
Figure 12. Consumption expectations in the spring and autumn projections 
of the Ministry of Finance of Bulgaria for the period of 2019 – 2022  
(before the crisis of 2020) 
 
For those who have lost their income, the uncertainty of the future will 
remain even when they start receiving their regular income again – it will no 
longer be the same income or the same job under the previous conditions. At 
the same time, household debt keeps rising due to rents, mortgages, consumer 
loans, education and healthcare expenses. If the crisis lasts for a long time, all 
or the great majority of the consumers will have to cut further their consumer 
spending in order to have sufficient funds to cover their current liabilities. Many 
people today simply do not have an emergency cash stash. Therefore, the 
situation we can expect will be a situation of lower incomes, need for 
extraordinary savings, and much lower consumption, which will affect the 
overall consumption and demand in the economy. Those employed in the 
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private sector will save more and invest even less than before. All this means a 
slow recovery.   
As many companies go bankrupt, the number of the so-called bad or 
non-performing bank loans will increase, which will inevitably reduce their 
volume. The quantitative easing stimulus for the banking system will not be 
sufficient and there will be a delay in the distribution of new loans and credits. 
It is not certain whether this widely proclaimed quantitative easing will be able 
to maintain or boost consumption and investments that are needed to speed up 
the recovery of Bulgaria's economy. And let us not forget that all this will 
happen against the background of a severe demographic crisis in Bulgaria and 
its social security and pension systems already in the risk zone.  
Therefore, without a comprehensive economic and social program to 
deal with the crisis, without a new model of economic governance, Bulgaria 
will find it difficult to change its status of a weak, poor and uncompetitive 





The intention of the author of this article was, based on the lessons of 
previous global crises, to define the longer-term macroeconomic challenges and 
risks to the world economy in general and Bulgaria in particular, assuming that 
such a result can be achieved with by means of such a short analysis of a 
complex and still unexplored topic. We do not think that 2020 will be similar 
to 1929 or even 2019, but given the scale of the shock for the world economy, 
its weaknesses since 2010, the huge indebtedness of the largest economies and 
the combination of macroeconomic and geopolitical challenges, we are 
convinced that the crisis will not be overcome so quickly. The easing of 
quarantine measures and lockdowns reveals absolutely nothing about the 
dynamics of consumption and investment consequences from the rising 
unemployment, bankruptcies, and the stark structural problems of national 
economies. We know that those who survive the crisis will be more indebted; 
that households will sustain a shock regarding their savings and will have to cut 
down their post-crisis consumption. At present, macroeconomic science cannot 
give an exact answer as to when the crisis will end, much less in what scenario. 
It all depends on hundreds of combinations of many factors, including health, 
social, political, government behaviour, elections, decisions of international 
organizations, behaviour of large groups of people, etc.   
Nonetheless, we can still learn some lessons from both the crises in the 
past and the current crisis: 
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 Economies may collapse at any time – both the shock and the 
moment of truth may occur at any moment. 
 Financial markets are complex systems. 
 Aggregate demand and supply are key factors for overcoming the 
crisis. 
 Aggressive fiscal policies are needed. 
 Preservation of the financial system is a key priority. 
 Each business cycle is unique. 
 Reduction of inequality is critical together with the solutions for 
overcoming the slowdown. 
 Military conflicts are typical inflation events because they boost 
demand while pandemics reduce both demand and supply.    
Those who agree with the arguments used in this article are aware that 
the global economy and financial markets, the corporate sector, and the 
household sector are likely to go from the phase of shock to the phase of gradual 
recovery within the next six months or year. In any case, this transition will not 
be the same for everyone or synchronized as the shock was and will be 
accompanied by considerable crisis disappointments and failures. 
Governments, investors, companies, and households should prepare for a 
relatively different economic and investment landscape, regulations, and post-
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